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Abstract
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the
limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual
setup where current states are observed by the players, we first show that the set of
stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide the first examples
where the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction can be robust to
perturbations of the payoffs, and to the introduction of normal-form correlation. Next
we naturally introduce the more general model of hidden stochastic game, where the
players publicly receive imperfect signals over current states. In this setup we present
a last example where not only the limit set of equilibrium payoffs does not exist, but
there is no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs. The example is symmetric and
robust in many aspects, in particular to the introduction of extensive-form correlation
or communication devices. No uniform equilibrium payoff exists, and the equilibrium
set has full support for each discount factor and each initial state.
1 Introduction
Most economic and social interactions have a dynamic aspect, and equilibrium
plays of dynamic games are typically not obtained by successions of myopic equi-
libria of the current one-shot interaction, but need to take into account both the
effects of actions over current payoffs, and over future payoffs in the continuation
game. In this paper we consider dynamic games with 2 players1, where the ac-
tions taken by the players are perfectly observed at the end of every stage. We
denote by Eδ, resp. E
′
δ, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs, resp. sequential
equilibrium payoffs, of the δ-discounted game, and we write E∞ for the set of
∗TSE (GREMAQ, Universite´ Toulouse 1 Capitole), 21 alle´e de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse,
France. Both authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Agence Nationale de la
Recherche, under grant ANR JEUDY, ANR-10-BLAN 0112, and thank J. Bolte, T. Mariotti
and T. Tomala for fruitful discussions.
1This simplifies the exposition, but our results extend to the n-player case.
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uniform equilibrium payoffs of the dynamic game. We mainly study the limit2 of
E ′δ as players get extremely patient, i.e. as the discount factor goes to one.
In a repeated game, the dynamic interaction consists of the repetition of a
given one-shot game, and we have the standard Folk Theorems, with pioneering
work from the seventies by Aumann and Shapley, and Rubinstein. Regarding se-
quential equilibrium payoffs, the Folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
implies that for generic payoff functions, E ′δ converges to the set of feasible and
individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game, and Wen (1994) showed how to
adapt the notion of individually rational payoffs to obtain a Folk theorem without
genericity assumption. Without assumptions on the payoffs, E∞ coincides with
the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game, and the
set of Nash equilibrium payoffs Eδ also converges to this set (see Sorin (1986)).
These results have been generalized in many ways to games with imperfectly ob-
served actions (see e.g. Abreu et al. (1990), Fudenberg Levine (1991), Fudenberg
Levine Maskin (1994), Fudenberg et al. (2007), Lehrer (1990, 1992a, 1992b), or
Renault Tomala (2004, 2011)), but this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953) and generalize repeated
games: the payoff functions of the players evolve from stage to stage, and depend
on a state variable observed by the players, whose evolution is influenced by the
players’ actions. In the zero-sum case, Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) proved the
existence of the limit of the discounted value (hence of Eδ and E
′
δ) when δ goes
to one. An example of Sorin (1984) shows that in the general-sum case limδ→1 Eδ
and E∞ may be non-empty and disjoint. Vieille (2000) proved that E∞ is always
non-empty, that is there exists a uniform equilibrium payoff3.
Regarding discounted equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games, several Folk
theorems have been proved under various assumptions. Dutta (1995) assumes
that the set of long-run feasible payoffs is independent of the initial state, has
full dimension, and that minmax long-run payoffs also do not depend on the
initial state. Fudenberg4 and Yamamoto (2011) assume that the stochastic game
is irreducible (all players but one can always drive the current state where they
want, possibly in many stages, with positive probability). Ho¨rner et al. (2011)
generalize the recursive methods of Fudenberg Levine Maskin (1994) to compute
a limit equilibrium set in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring when
this limit set does not depend on the initial state (this happens when the Markov
chain induced by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible).
All the above assumptions somehow require that the stochastic game does not
depend too much on the initial state, and in particular forbid the existence of
2for the Hausdorff distance, defined as d(A,B) = max{maxa∈A d(a,B),maxb∈B d(b, A)} for
A and B non-empty compact subsets of IR2. d(A,B) ≤ ε means that: every point in A is at a
distance at most ε from a point in B, and conversely.
3The generalization of this result to more players is a well-known open question in dynamic
games.
4Fudenberg and Yamamoto 2011, as well as Ho¨rner et al. (2011), consider the more general
case of imperfect public monitoring.
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multiple absorbing5 states with different equilibrium payoffs. We believe that it
is also meaningful to study stochastic games where the actions taken can have
irreversible effects on future plays. This is the case in many situations, for example
in stopping games when each player only acts once and has to decide when to do
so, or when the actions partially represent investment decisions, or extractions of
exhaustible resources.
The first contributions of our paper concern 2-player stochastic games with
finitely many states and actions. We first prove that the set of stationary6 equi-
librium payoffs of the discounted game always converges to a non-empty set. As a
consequence, there always exists a selection of E ′δ which converges. Secondly, we
show that the convergence property cannot be extended to the Nash or sequen-
tial equilibrium payoffs sets by providing the first examples of stochastic games
where neither Eδ nor E
′
δ converges: the limit of the equilibrium set may simply
not exist in a stochastic game. Our first example is robust to the introduction of
normal-form correlation, and our second example shows that the non convergence
property can be robust to small perturbations of the payoffs. However we point
out that both examples are not robust to the introduction of an extensive-form
correlation device. In each case, the set of equilibrium payoffs has empty interior
for any discount factor, and the limits of converging selections of E ′δ coincide with
the uniform equilibrium payoffs. In these examples, we believe that the elements
of the limit set of stationary equilibrium payoffs emerge as natural outcomes of
the game played by extremely patient players.
In the rest of the paper we introduce the more general model of hidden stochas-
tic games, and we refer to the above original model as standard stochastic games.
In a hidden stochastic game, the players still perfectly observe past actions but
no longer perfectly observe current states, and rather receive at the beginning
of every stage a public, possibly random, signal on the current state. So players
have incomplete information over the sequence of states, but this information is
common to both players. Note that in the zero-sum case this model was con-
sidered in Gimbert et al. [13]. Hidden stochastic games are generalizations of
hidden Markov decision processes (where there is a single agent), hence the name.
Hidden stochastic games also generalize repeated games with common incomplete
information on the state. We believe this model is meaningful in many interac-
tions where the fundamentals are not perfectly known to the players. We present
in particular two examples of economic interactions that could be modeled as a
hidden stochastic game. The first example is a Cournot competition on a market
for a natural exhaustible resource, where the players have common incomplete
information on the stock of natural resources remaining. The second example
is an oligopoly competition with a single good (e.g., traditional tv sets) where
5When an absorbing state is reached, the play will remain forever in that state, no matter
the actions played.
6A stationary strategy of a player plays after every history a mixed action which only depends
on the current state.
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the state variable includes parameters known to the firms, such as the current
demand level, but also parameters imperfectly known such as the trend of the
market or the overall state of the economy.
Surprisingly enough, few papers have already considered stochastic games
with imperfect observation of the state. In the zero-sum context, Venel (2012)
studied hidden stochastic games where the players do not receive any signal on
the state during the game, and proves under a commutativity assumption over
transitions the existence of the limit value, as well as the stronger notion of uni-
form value (corresponding to uniform equilibrium payoffs). Ziliotto (2013) showed
that the commutativity assumption was needed for Venel’s result, and provided
an example of a zero-sum hidden stochastic game7 with payoffs in [0, 1] where the
δ-discounted value oscillates between 1/2 and 5/9 when δ goes to one.
Given parameters ε in (0, 5/12) and r in (0, ε/5), we provide an example of
a 2-player hidden stochastic game with all payoffs in [0, 1], four actions for each
player, having the following features:
- the game is symmetric between the players,
- the players have incomplete information over the current state, but the public
signals received are informative enough for the players to know the current stage
payoff functions at the beginning of every stage. As a consequence, the players
know their current payoffs during the play.
- there are 13 states, and for any initial state and discount factor the set
of sequential equilibrium payoffs contains a square with side 2r, hence has full
dimension.
- for a specific initial state k1, there exist subsets ∆1 and ∆2 of discount
factors, both containing 1 as a limit point, such that for all discount factors in
∆1, the corresponding set of sequential equilibrium payoffs is exactly the square
E1 centered in (ǫ, ǫ) with side 2r, whereas for all discount factors in ∆2, the set
8 of
sequential equilibrium payoffs is the square E2 centered in (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ) with side
2r. In each case the associated square is also the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs,
the set of (normal or extensive-form) correlated equilibrium payoffs, and the set
of communication9 equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game. Since these two
squares are disjoint, there is no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs, and
the game has no uniform equilibrium payoff.
Moreover the example is robust to small perturbations of the payoffs: if one
perturbs all payoffs of the game by at most 1
2
r(ε−5r), the set of discounted equi-
librium payoffs of the perturbed game with initial state k1 still does not converge,
no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs exists and there is no uniform equi-
7The example of Ziliotto provides a negative answer to two conjectures of Mertens (1986)
for zero-sum dynamic games.
8As an illustration, if ε = .3 and r = .05, for any discount factor in ∆1 the set of equilibrium
payoffs is the square E1 = [.25, .35]
2
, and for any discount in ∆2 the set of equilibrium payoffs
is the square E2 = [.65, .75]
2.
9 introduced in Myerson, 1986 and Forges, 1986.
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librium payoff.
Our last example is thus robust in many aspects, and it seems impossible to
affect to this game a reasonable limit equilibrium payoff. The model of hidden
stochastic games may be seen as a small departure from the standard model of
stochastic game, but it seems very difficult for an expert to find any good answer
to the informal question: “The game being played by extremely patient players,
which outcome is likely to form ?”
We study standard stochastic games in section 2. Hidden stochastic games
are introduced in section 3, and our last example is presented in section 4. The
construction elaborates and improves on the zero-sum construction of Ziliotto
(2013). The presentation is done here in 5 progressive steps, starting with a
Markov chain on [0, 1], then a Markov Decision Process, then a zero-sum stochas-
tic game with infinite state space, a zero-sum hidden stochastic game and a final
example. A few proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
We denote respectively by IN , IR and IR+ the sets of non negative integers,
real numbers and non negative real numbers.
2 Standard Stochastic Games
We consider a 2-player stochastic game. Let K, I and J respectively be the finite
sets of states, actions for player 1 and actions for player 2. k1 in K is the initial
state, u1 and u2 are the state dependent utility functions from K × I × J to IR,
and q is the transition function from K × I × J to ∆(K), the set of probabilities
over K. At every period t ≥ 1 players first learn the current state kt ∈ K and
simultaneously select actions it ∈ I and jt ∈ J . These actions are then publicly
observed, the stage payoffs are u1(kt, it, jt) for player 1 and u2(kt, it, jt) for player
2, a new state kt+1 is selected according to the distribution q(kt, it, jt), and the
play goes to the next period. Given a discount factor δ in [0, 1), the δ-discounted
stochastic game is the infinite horizon game where player 1 and player 2’s payoffs
are respectively (1− δ)∑∞t=1 δt−1u1(kt, it, jt) and (1− δ)∑∞t=1 δt−1u2(kt, it, jt).
Let Eδ and E
′
δ respectively denote the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs and the
set of perfect10 equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted stochastic game. Stan-
dard fixed-point arguments show the existence of a stationary equilibrium in this
game, and the associated equilibrium payoff lies in E ′δ and Eδ. In this paper,
we are mainly interested in the asymptotic behavior of these sets when players
become more and more patient, i.e. we will look for their limit11 when δ goes to
10subgame-perfect equilibrium, or equivalently here, sequential equilibrium, or equivalently
perfect public equilibrium, as defined in Fudenberg Levine Maskin 1994 for repeated games with
perfect public monitoring and extended to stochastic games in Fudenberg Yamamoto 2011.
11All limits of sets in the paper are to be understood for the Hausdorff distance between
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1. And we will also briefly consider the set E∞ of uniform equilibrium12 payoffs
of the stochastic game.
When there is a single state, the game is a standard repeated game with
perfect monitoring, and we have well-known Folk Theorems.
For zero-sum stochastic games, Shapley (1953) proved that the value vδ ex-
ists and players have stationary optimal strategies, so Eδ and E
′
δ are singletons.
Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) proved the convergence of vδ (hence, of Eδ and E
′
δ)
using algebraic arguments13.
The following proposition shows how the Bewley Kohlberg result extends
to general-sum games. Denote by E ′′δ the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs
of the δ-discounted game. In the zero-sum case, Eδ = E
′
δ = E
′′
δ . In general,
stationary equilibria are very simple equilibria where the strategies of the players
are particularly restricted, and E ′′δ is a subset of E
′
δ.
Proposition 2.1. There exists a non-empty compact set E such that:
E ′′δ −−→
δ→1
E.
In the case of repeated games (a single state), E reduces to the set of mixed Nash
equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game, hence may not be convex. The proof
of proposition 2.1 is in the Appendix and largely relies on the semi-algebraicity
of the set of discount factors and associated stationary equilibria and payoffs. As
stated here, it holds for any 2-player stochastic game with finitely many states
and actions, but the proof easily extends to the n-player case. As a consequence,
using a point in E one can construct a selection of (E ′δ)δ which converges, i.e. it
is possible to select, for each discount δ, a perfect equilibrium payoff xδ of the
corresponding game in a way such that xδ has a limit when δ goes to one.
Corollary 2.2. There exists a converging selection of (E ′δ)δ.
This corollary can also be easily deduced fromMertens Sorin Zamir (1994, Lemma
2.2 in chapter 7) and Neyman (2003, Theorem 5), who have proved the existence
of a semi-algebraic selection of E ′′δ . Because payoffs are bounded, this selection
converges.
It is then now natural to ask if the convergence property of proposition 2.1
also holds for Eδ and E
′
δ. We conclude this section by providing the first examples
of stochastic games where these sets of equilibrium payoffs diverge.
non-empty compact sets of IR2.
12Throughout the paper, we say that a vector u in IR2 is a uniform equilibrium payoff if
for all ε > 0, there exists a strategy profile such that for all high enough discount factors, the
profile is a ε-Nash equilibrium of the discounted game with payoff ε-close to u, see Sorin 1986,
Mertens Sorin and Zamir 1994 or Vieille 2000 for related definitions.
13Recently, Bolte et al. (2013) extended this algebraic approach to a class of stochastic games
with infinite action sets.
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Proposition 2.3. There exists a 2-player stochastic game where neither Eδ nor
E ′δ converge. The construction can be robust to perturbations of the payoffs, and
to the introduction of normal-form correlation.
To prove the proposition, we first present a simple example (Example 2.4
below) where Eδ and E
′
δ diverge, and which is robust to the introduction of
normal-form correlation. Then we provide a more elaborate example (Example
2.7) which is robust to perturbations of the payoffs.
Example 2.4. Consider the stochastic game represented by the following picture.
k1
k2
k3
(1/2, 0)∗
(0, 1/2)∗
T B
RL
P1
P2
L R
T
B
(
(1, 0) 	 (−1,−1)∗
(−1,−1)∗ (0, 1)∗
)
There are 7 states: k1 (the initial state), k2, k3 and 4 absorbing states: (1/2, 0)
∗,
(0, 1/2)∗, (−1,−1)∗ and (0, 1)∗. When an absorbing state (a, b)∗ is reached, the
game stays there forever and at each stage the payoffs to player 1 and player 2
are respectively a and b. The sets of actions are I = {T,B} for player 1 and
J = {L,R} for player 2. The transition from state k1 only depends on player 1’s
action, as indicated in the above figure, and similarly the transition from state
k2 only depends on player 2’s action. If in state k3 the action profile (T, L) is
played, the vector payoff is (1, 0) and the play remains in k3. To conclude the
description, we have to specify the payoffs in states k1, k2, and k3. The payoff in
k1 is (1/2, 0) if T is played and (1/2, 1/2) if B is played. The payoff in state k2
does not depend on the actions played and is (1/2, 1/2), and the payoffs in state
k3 are simply given by the bimatrix
(
(1, 0) (−1,−1)
(−1,−1) (0, 1)
)
.
For each discount, it is clear that (1/2, 0) is in Eδ, and the question is whether
there are other equilibrium payoffs, for instance (1/2, 1/2).
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First consider any δ in [0, 1), and a Nash equilibrium (σ, τ) of the δ-discounted
stochastic game with equilibrium payoff (x, y). Because Player 1 can play T in
the initial state, x ≥ 1/2. Because the sum of payoffs never exceeds 1, we have
x+ y ≤ 1. Assume now that under (σ, τ) the state k3 has positive probability to
be reached, and denote by (x3, y3) the discounted payoffs induced by (σ, τ) given
that k3 is reached. We have x3 ≥ 1/2, because player 1 will not accept to play B
at k1 if he obtains a payoff lower than 1/2 afterwards. Similarly, y3 ≥ 1/2. Since
x3 + y3 ≤ 1, we get x3 = y3 = 1/2, so (1/2, 1/2) is an equilibrium payoff of the
reduced stochastic game:
L R
T
B
(
(1, 0) 	 (−1,−1)∗
(−1,−1)∗ (0, 1)∗
)
.
The unique way to obtain (1/2, 1/2) as a feasible payoff in the reduced game is to
play first (T, L) for a certain number of periods N , then (B,R) at period N + 1.
Given δ, the integer N has to satisfy (1− δ)∑Nt=1 δt−1 = 1/2, that is:
δN =
1
2
.
If no such integer N exists, we obtain that (1/2, 1/2) is not an equilibrium pay-
off of the reduced game, so under (σ, τ) the state k3 has zero probability to be
reached, which implies that x = 1/2 and y = 0.
We define ∆1 as the set of discount factors of the form δ = (
1
2
)
1/N
, where N
is a positive integer, and we put ∆2 = [0, 1)\∆1. We have obtained:
Lemma 2.5. For all δ in ∆2, Eδ = E
′
δ = {(1/2, 0)}.
Consider now δ in ∆1, and N such that δ
N = 1
2
. The pure strategy profiles
where: T is played at stage 1, R is played at stage 2, (T, L) is played for N periods
from stage 3 to stage N+2, and (B,R) is played at stage N+3, form a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of the δ-discounted game with payoff (1/2, 1/2). By
mixing between T and B in k1, it is then possible to obtain any point (1/2, x),
with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, as an equilibrium payoff. And no other point can be obtained,
because in every equilibrium, the vector payoff conditional on k3 being reached,
is (1/2, 1/2). We have obtained:
Lemma 2.6. For all δ in ∆1, Eδ = E
′
δ = {1/2} × [0, 1/2].
Because both ∆1 and ∆2 contain discount factors arbitrarily close to 1, lemmas
2.5 and 2.6 establish that neither Eδ nor E
′
δ converge
14.
14One can also consider for any positive integer n, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs En
and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs E′n of the n-period stochastic game, where the overall
payoff is defined as the arithmetic average of the stage payoffs. Similar arguments show that in
Example 2.4, we have En = E
′
n = {1/2} × [0, 1/2] for n even, and En = E′n = {(1/2, 0)} for n
odd. So En and E
′
n also do not converge when n goes to infinity.
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Consider now normal-form correlated equilibrium payoffs, i.e. Nash equi-
librium payoffs of games where the players may initially receive private signals
independent of the payoffs. For δ in ∆2, the proof of Lemma 2.5 applies and the
set of normal-form correlated equilibrium payoffs still is the singleton {(1/2, 0)}.
So the set of normal-form correlated equilibrium payoffs can not converge when
the discount factor goes to one.
Notice that an important feature of the reduced game is that there is (at most)
a unique way to obtain the payoff (1/2,1/2). As soon as one perturbs the payoffs,
this property will disappear, and example 2.4 is not robust to perturbations of
the payoffs of the stochastic game. 
Example 2.7. The stochastic game is represented by the following matrices:
State k1:
L M R
T
B
(
(1, 1)∗ (−30,−30)∗ (−30,−30)∗
(−1,−1)k2 (−30,−30)∗ (−30,−30)∗
)
State k2:
L M R
T
B
(
(−1,−1) 	 (−12,−11)∗ (−4,−7)∗
(−22,−12)∗ (3,−2)∗ (−9,−4)∗
)
There are 2 non absorbing states: k1 (the initial state) and k2, and 7 absorbing
states. Player 1 has 2 actions: T and B, and player 2 has 3 actions: L, M and
R. Playing (B,L) in state k1(or (T, L) in state k2) leads to state k2.
Consider the δ-discounted game. In any Nash equilibrium, Player 2 plays L
at stage 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium where (T, L) is played at stage 1, and
if δ ≥ 1/2 there also exists a Nash equilibrium where (B,L) is played at stage
1 and (B,M) is played at stage 2. So for δ ≥ 1/2, Eδ contains the payoff (1, 1)
as well as a payoff with second coordinate not greater than -1 for player 2. The
question is now whether Eδ contains payoffs with second coordinate in (−1, 1),
i.e. if at equilibrium player 1 can mix between T and B at stage 1.
Lemma 2.8. In the game with initial state k2 and discount δ, the set of Nash
(or perfect) equilibrium payoffs is:
{(1− δN)(−1,−1) + δN(u1, u2), N ∈ IN ∪ {+∞}, (u1, u2) ∈ {(3,−2), (−6,−5)}}.
Proof: Let (σ, τ) be a Nash equilibrium of the stochastic game with initial state
k2. We prove that under (σ, τ), either (T, L) is played at every stage, or (T, L)
is first played a certain number N of stages, then followed if N is finite by an
absorbing action profile with payoff (3,−2) or (−6,−5).
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Denote by α′ the best reply payoff of player 1 against the continuation strategy
induced by τ after (T, L) was played at stage 1. We have α′ ∈ [−10, 3], and define
α = (1− δ)(−1) + δα′ ∈ [−10, 3]. Similarly, denote by β ′ the best reply payoff of
player 2 against the continuation strategy induced by σ after (T, L) was played at
stage 1. And define β = (1− δ)(−1) + δβ ′ ∈ [−13/2,−1]. The strategies induced
by (σ, τ) at stage 1 form a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game:
L M R
T
B
(
(α, β) (−12,−11) (−4,−7)
(−22,−12) (3,−2) (−9,−4)
)
.
Let x, resp. y1, y2, y3, be the probability that σ, resp. τ , plays T , resp. L, M ,
R at stage 1. If y1y2 > 0, player 2 is indifferent between L and M , which implies
that x = 10
21+β
∈ [1/2, 5/7]. But then R is strictly better than M for player 2,
hence a contradiction with y2 > 0. If y1y3 > 0, then y2 = 0 and T is strictly
better than B for player 1, so x = 1 which contradicts y3 > 0. Consequently, if
y1 > 0 the only case is y1 = 1, and x = 1. (σ, τ) plays (T, L) at stage 1.
If y1 = 0, we have a Nash equilibrium of the game
M R
T
B
(
(−12,−11) (−4,−7)
(3,−2) (−9,−4)
)
,
and obtain15 that either (B,M), or the mixed action profile
(1/3T + 2/3B, 1/4M + 3/4R), is played by (σ, τ) at stage 1. Notice that both
(B,M) and (1/3T +2/3B, 1/4M +3/4R) lead with probability one to absorbing
states of the stochastic game.
Iterating the argument from stage 1 on, leads to the inclusion of the Nash equi-
librium payoffs set into {(1−δN )(−1,−1)+δN(u1, u2), N ∈ IN∪{+∞}, (u1, u2) ∈
{(3,−2), (−6,−5)}}. It is then easy to see that the conclusions of Lemma 2.8 hold.
We now uniquely consider the stochastic game with initial state k1. Define
∆1 = {δ ∈ [0, 1), ∃M ≥ 1, (1 − δM)(−1) + 3δM = 1}, which is as in Example
2.4 the countable set of discount factors of the form (1
2
)
1/M
, with M a positive
integer.
Consider δ = (1
2
)
1/M ∈ ∆1, there exists a Nash equilibrium where (B,L) is
played at stage 1 having payoff (1, u2), with u2 ≤ −1. Considering equilibria
where player 1 mixes at stage 1, we obtain for δ in ∆1:
{1} × [−1, 1] ⊂ E ′δ.
15The profile (T,R) is ruled out by action L of player 2.
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On the contrary, for δ /∈ ∆1, no Nash equilibrium of the stochastic game can
mix between T and B at stage 1, so the equilibrium payoffs set satisfy:
Eδ ∩ {(u1, u2), u2 ∈ (−1, 1)} = ∅.
This is enough to conclude that Eδ and E
′
δ do not converge as δ goes to one. And
one can easily check that all arguments are robust to small perturbations of the
payoffs of the stochastic game. 
We want to point out that the above examples are limited in several ways. In
particular:
1) Many Folk theorems in the literature require the limit set to have non-
empty interior. In both examples, Eδ = E
′
δ has empty interior for each discount
factor.
2) The examples are not robust to the introduction of an extensive-form cor-
relation device. In example 2.4, if whenever k3 is reached the players can publicly
observe the outcome of a fair coin tossing, they can correlate and play there (T, L)
and (B,R) with probability 1/2. With such correlation device, it is possible to
obtain (1/2, 1/2) as an equilibrium payoff for all discount factors.
In example 2.7, the distance between the segment {1} × [−1, 1] and the set
of normal-form correlated equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted game goes to
0 when δ goes to 1: consider a public correlation device mixing between the
equilibrium with payoff (1, 1) and the equilibrium with payoff (1−δN )(−1,−1)+
δN(3,−2) with N the smallest integer such that δN ≥ 1/2.
3) If the sets of equilibrium payoffs do not converge, some long-term equilib-
rium payoffs clearly emerge. In example 2.4, for all converging selections (xδ)δ of
(E ′δ)δ, the limit payoff is (1/2, 0), and for all discount δ the unique stationary equi-
librium payoffs is also (1/2, 0). Moreover, one can show that E∞ = {(1/2, 0)},
i.e. the unique uniform equilibrium payoff is (1/2, 0). And playing B in k1 is
somehow a risky option for player 1, since he can immediately secure 1/2 by
playing T and has almost no chance to get a better payoff by playing B. So
even if the sets of equilibrium payoffs do not converge, the payoff (1/2, 0) clearly
emerges, and we believe it can be considered as the reasonable limit outcome of
the stochastic game. If an expert is asked “The game being played by extremely
patient players, which outcome is likely to form ?”, we would recommend the
answer to be (1/2, 0).
In example 2.7, the limits of converging selections (xδ)δ of (E
′
δ)δ are the ele-
ments of the set E∞ of uniform equilibrium payoffs of the stochastic game, which
is the union of the singleton {(1, 1)} and of the line segment joining (1,−3/2) to
(3,−2). The limit set of stationary equilibrium payoffs E defined by proposition
2.1 is the pair {(1, 1), (3,−2)}. (1, 1) is achieved by an equilibrium where player
2 plays L in every period, and (3,−2) is achieved by an equilibrium where player
1 first plays T , then B in each period. When the game is played by very patient
players, we believe that one of these two payoff vectors is likely to occur.
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The counterexample of the next section will not have these limiting properties
and will be very robust in many aspects.
3 Hidden Stochastic Games
We enlarge the model of stochastic games by assuming that at the beginning of
every period, the players observe a public signal on the current state. We still
denote by K, I and J respectively the finite sets of states, actions for player 1
and actions for player 2, and we introduce a finite set S of public signals. As
in the previous section, u1 and u2 are the state dependent utility functions from
K × I × J −→ IR, but now the transition function q goes from K × I × J to
∆(K×S), the set of probabilities over K ×S, and there is an initial distribution
π in ∆(K × S). The elements K, I, J , S, u1, u2, q and π are known to the
players.
At the first period, a couple (k1, s1) is selected according to π, and the players
publicly observe s1, but not k1. The players simultaneously select actions i1 ∈
I and j1 ∈ J , then these actions are publicly observed, the stage payoffs are
u1(k1, i1, j1) for player 1 and u2(k1, i1, j1) for player 2, and the play goes to period
2. At every period t ≥ 2, a couple (kt, st) is selected according to q(kt−1, it−1, jt−1),
kt is the state of period t but the players only observe the public signal st. Then
they simultaneously select actions it ∈ I and jt ∈ J . These actions are publicly
observed, the stage payoffs are u1(kt, it, jt) for player 1 and u2(kt, it, jt) for player
2, and the play goes to the period t + 1. Given a discount factor δ in [0, 1),
the δ-discounted hidden stochastic game is the game with payoff functions (1 −
δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1u1(kt, it, jt) and (1− δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1u2(kt, it, jt). We respectively denote
by Eδ and E
′
δ the sets of Nash equilibrium payoffs and sequential equilibrium
payoffs of this game.
This is a generalization of the model of stochastic game presented in section
2, where one has S = K and st = kt for all t. In the model of hidden stochastic
game (HSG, for short), the players have incomplete information on the current
state, but this information is common to both players, and can be represented
by a belief pt on the state kt. Given the initial signal s1, the initial belief p1
is the conditional probability induced by π on K given s1. The belief pt is a
random variable which can be computed16 recursively from pt−1 by Bayes’ rule
after observing the public signal st and the past actions it−1 and jt−1. We can thus
associate to our HSG, an equivalent stochastic game where the state variable p lies
in ∆(K) and represents the common belief on the current state in the HSG, and
where now actions and state variables are publicly observed, in addition to the
public17 signal s. A strategy in the HSG uniquely defines an equivalent strategy
16Notice that this belief does not depend on the strategy of the players, as in repeated games
with incomplete information, but only on past actions played and public signals observed.
17In the equivalent stochastic game, the public signal s gives no extra information on past
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in the stochastic game, and vice-versa. And in particular the sets of equilibrium
payoffs of the two games coincide. By definition, a stationary strategy in the
associated stochastic game plays after every history a mixed action which only
depends on the current state variable in ∆(K). And we will say that a strategy
σ in the HSG is stationary if the associated strategy in the stochastic game is
stationary, that is if σ plays after every history a mixed action which only depends
on the current belief in ∆(K).
Standard fixed-point (contraction) arguments show that Eδ and E
′
δ are non-
empty, and there exists a stationary equilibrium in the δ-discounted associated
stochastic game. We will also briefly consider the set of uniform equilibrium
payoffs E∞, defined as in the previous section.
When there is a single player (for instance, when player 2 has a unique action),
a hidden stochastic game is simply a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP), and if moreover player 1 plays constantly the same mixed action, we
obtain a Hidden Markov model, which can be considered as the simplest model
of dynamic Bayesian network. Hidden stochastic games generalize both standard
stochastic games and POMDP. An interesting subclass of hidden stochastic games
is the following class of HSG with known payoffs, where the public signals are
rich enough for the players to know after every history what is the current payoff
function. We write q(k, i, j)(k′, s) the probability in [0, 1] that the couple (k′, s)
is chosen when the probability q(k, i, j) is used.
Definition 3.1. The hidden stochastic game has known payoffs if the set of states
K can be partitioned18 in a way such that for all states k, k′, k1, k2, actions i, i′
in I, j, j′ in J , and signal s in S:
1)if k1 ∼ k2 then u1(k1, i, j) = u1(k2, i, j) and u2(k1, i, j) = u2(k2, i, j) (two
states in the same element of the partition induce the same payoff function), and
2) if q(k, i, j)(k1, s) > 0 and q(k
′, i′, j′)(k2, s) > 0 then k1 ∼ k2 (observing
the public signal is enough to deduce the element of the partition containing the
current state).
In a hidden stochastic game with known payoffs, the players know after every
history the cell of the partition containing the current state, so when players
choose their actions they know the current payoff function, as it happens in a
standard stochastic game . However they may not exactly know the current state
in K, so they are uncertain about the transition probabilities to the next state,
and to the cell containing this state. In a standard stochastic game, one can
define: k ∼ k′ if and only if k = k′, and the conditions of definition 3.1 are
satisfied. Hence HSG with known payoffs generalize stochastic games, and this
generalization is meaningful in several cases.
actions or on the state variable. Its unique influence is that it may be used by the players as
a correlation device. Notice that the equivalent stochastic game is not a standard stochastic
game as described in section 2.
18We write k1 ∼ k2 whenever k1 and k2 are in the same equivalence class, or cell, of the
partition.
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Example 3.2. The players are firms competing a la Cournot on a market for a
natural exhaustible resource. Only two firms are present on this market, and in
each period, each firm decides how much resource to extract (to produce). Then
a price is set in order to equalize offer and demand, and all the production is sold
at this price. Action sets are I = {0, ...,M1} and J = {0, ...,M2} where Mf is
the maximal possible production (e.g., in tonnes) of firm f . The state variable
k is the amount of natural resources remaining (the stock), and the firms have
incomplete information on remaining stocks. They have a common belief on the
initial stock value k1, and there is a capM such that in each period, if the current
stock k is greater thanM the firms just know that there are at leastM remaining
resources, whereas if k is at most M the firms precisely know k. Transitions are
deterministic : if in some state k, actions i and j such that i+ j ≤ k are played,
then it is possible for the firms to actually produce the quantities x and y, and
the next state is19 k − (i + j). If k > i + j, the next state is 0 and the game is
essentially over. Payoffs are function of the actions, and possibly of the current
state as well (when the state is lower than the sum of productions, or when the
state does not exceed M and the demand anticipates the scarcity of the resource).
Example 3.3. Consider an oligopoly with two firms on a market for a single good.
In each period (e.g., a year) a firm chooses its selling price, as well as development
and advertising budgets. The state variable k represents the state of the market,
which includes, but is not limited to, the current demand function for each firm,
which is a function of the current price profile. The state also contains additional
information about fundamentals which will influence the future evolution of the
demand, such as the trend of the market, the development of close goods by other
firms or the overall state of the economy. In each period revenues are determined
by the current demand function and the current prices chosen, and stage payoffs
are the revenues minus development and advertising budgets. Transitions of the
state variable depend on the state variable and the actions chosen, and firms are
able to observe at the beginning of every period, at least the current demand
function but possibly not all characteristics of the state.
Regarding limit equilibrium payoffs in hidden stochastic games, we know by
proposition 2.3 that there is no hope to obtain convergence of the sequences (Eδ)δ
or (E ′δ)δ. The following result shows that the situation is even more dramatic in
our context of hidden stochastic games.
Theorem 3.4. For each ε in (0, 5
12
] and r in (0, ε/5), there exists a 2-player
Hidden Stochastic Game Γ having the following properties:
1. There are 13 states and public signals, four actions for each player, and all payoffs
lie in [0, 1],
2. The game is symmetric between the players, and has known payoffs,
19A more general variant for partially renewable resources would read: the next state is(1 +
r)(k − (i + j)), where r is the renewal rate.
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3. For all initial distributions and discount factors, the corresponding set of sequen-
tial equilibrium payoffs contains a square of side 2r, hence has full dimension,
4. There is an initial state k1, perfectly known to the players, and there exist two
subsets ∆1 and ∆2 of [0, 1), both containing discount factors arbitrarily close to
1, such that:
for all δ in ∆1, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs E
′
δ is the square E1
centered in (ǫ, ǫ) with side 2r, whereas for all δ in ∆2, the set of sequential
equilibrium payoffs E ′δ is the square E2 centered in (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ) with side 2r.
Moreover for δ in ∆1∪∆2, the associated square is also the set of Nash equilibrium
payoffs, the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs, and the set of communication
equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted game, as well as the set of stationary
equilibrium payoffs of the associated stochastic game with state variable the belief
on the states of the original game.
There is no converging selection of (Eδ)δ, and Γ has no uniform equilibrium
payoff.
5. The above conclusions are robust to perturbations of the payoffs. Consider, for
η ∈ [0, r(ε−5r)
2
), a perturbed game Γ(η) obtained by perturbing each payoff of Γ by
at most η. The initial state being k1, denote by Eδ(η) the corresponding set of
δ-discounted Nash equilibrium payoffs. We have:
∀δ ∈ ∆1, Eδ(η) ⊂ [ε− r − η, ε+ r + η]2,
∀δ ∈ ∆2, Eδ(η) ⊂ [1− ε− r − η, 1− ε+ r + η]2.
There is no converging selection of (Eδ(η))δ, and Γ(η) has no uniform equilibrium
payoff. Finally,
lim
η→0
lim
δ→1,δ∈∆1
E ′δ(η) = E1 and lim
η→0
lim
δ→1,δ∈∆2
E ′δ(η) = E2,
lim
δ→1,δ∈∆1
lim sup
η→0
d(Eδ(η), E1) = 0 and lim
δ→1,δ∈∆2
lim sup
η→0
d(Eδ(η), E2) = 0.
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the case ε = .3, r = .05
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The rest of the paper is devoted to the construction of the example of theorem
3.4. We progressively introduce more and more ingredients in the construction,
starting with a Markov chain on [0, 1], then a Markov Decision Process, then a
zero-sum stochastic game with infinite state space, a zero-sum HSG and finally
our example20.
4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
4.1 A Markov chain on [0,1]
Given a parameter α ∈ (0, 1), we consider the following Markov chain with state
variable q in [0, 1] and initial state q0 = 1. Time is discrete, and if qt is the state
20Apart the presentation, the main differences with the 2013 example of Ziliotto are the
following. Due to the zero-sum aspect in the 2013 example the game was non symmetric and
equilibrium payoff sets had empty interior, this is taken care in the last construction of section
4. In the non zero-sum case here the associated stochastic game with state variable in ∆(K)
is not necessarily Nash-payoff equivalent to the HSG since public signals may be used in the
HSG as correlation devices. A main difference is that we need here equilibrium payoffs to go
not only from 1/2 to 5/9, but from arbitrarily close to 0 to arbitrarily close to 1, so we improve
the construction by studying Markov chains and MDP with general parameters α and β (which
were equal to 1/2 for both players in the 2013 example). The asymmetry between players was
obtained in 2013 by introducing a different structure for the MDP of player 2, whereas here the
consideration of different parameters allows to stick to a symmetric, hence somehow simpler,
construction. We also consider non zero-sum perturbations of the payoffs, and have to deal with
multiplicity of equilibria. Finally we also consider multiple solution concepts: Nash, sequential,
correlated and communication equilibria.
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of period t then with probability α the next state qt+1 is α qt and with probability
1− α the next state qt+1 is 1.
0
αq
q
1
α
1− α
Because of the transitions, the set of states that can be reached is the countable
set {αa, a ∈ IN}. This Markov chain can be viewed as follows: there is an
infinite sequence X1, ..., Xt, ... of i.i.d. Bernouilli random variables with success
parameter α, we add an initial constant variable X0 = 0, and at any period t the
state of the Markov chain is αa if and only if the last a (but not a+1) realizations
of the Bernouilli variables have been successful, i.e. iff Xt−a = 0 and Xt′ = 1 for
t− a+ 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t.
In the next subsection, the variable q will be interpreted as a risk variable with
the following interpretation. Suppose a decision-maker observes the realizations
of the Markov chain, and has to decide as a function of q when he will take a
risky action, having probability of success 1 − q and probability of failure q. He
would like q to be as small as possible, but time is costly and there is a discount
factor δ. For a in IN , we denote by Ta the stopping time of the first period where
the risk is αa, i.e.
Ta = inf{t ≥ 1, qt ≤ αa}.
If a = 0, then Ta = 1 and δ
Ta = δ. If a ≥ 1, then Ta is a random variable which
law can be easily computed by induction. Indeed, we have:
Ta = Ta−1 + 1 + 1XTa=0 T
′
a,
where T ′a has the same law as Ta and is independent from XTa−1. As a conse-
quence,
IE(Ta) =
1
α
(1 + IE(Ta−1)).
IE(Ta) grows exponentially with a, and this is an important feature of our coun-
terexample: while slightly decreasing the risk αa in the bounded set (0, 1], the
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number of stages one may have to wait before reaching the new risk level greatly
increases.
The expectation of δTa will play an important role in the sequel and can be
easily computed as well (see e.g. lemma 2.2 and proposition 2.6 in [12]).
Lemma 4.1.
IE(δTa) =
1− αδ
1− α + (1− δ)α−aδ−a−1 .
4.2 A Markov Decision Process on [0,1]
We introduce a player who observes the realizations of the above Markov chain
and can choose as a function of the state q when he will take a risky action,
having probability of success 1− q and probability of failure q. In case of success,
the payoff of the player will be R at all subsequent stages, where R is a fixed
positive reward. The payoff is 0 at any stage before taking the risky action, and
at any stage after the risky action has been taken unsuccessfully. Overall payoffs
are discounted with discount δ.
0
αq
q
1
0∗ R∗
α
1− α
q 1− q
In this MDP with finite actions set, there exists a pure stationary optimal
strategy. Notice that a pure stationary strategy of the player can be represented
by a non negative integer a, corresponding to the risk threshold αa. We define
the a-strategy of the player as the strategy where he takes the risky action as
soon as the state variable of the Markov chain does not exceed αa. The expected
discounted payoff induced is
IE
(
(1− δTa)0 + δTa(αa0 + (1− αa)R)) = R (1− αa) IE(δTa).
Hence using lemma 4.1, we obtain:
Lemma 4.2. The payoff of the a-strategy in the MDP with parameter α and
discount δ is:
(1− αa)(1− αδ)R
1− α + (1− δ)α−aδ−a−1 .
18
This payoff is proportional to R > 0, hence the optimal strategies do not
depend on the value of R. Intuitively this is clear, counting the reward in Dollars
or Euros does not affect the strategic problem of the decision-maker. This problem
is now to choose a non negative integer a maximizing the above payoff function.
Definition 4.3. Define, for all a in IR+,
sα,δ(a) = (1− αa)IE(δTa) = (1− α
a)(1− αδ)
1− α+ (1− δ)α−aδ−a−1 ,
and let vα,δ = maxa∈IN sα,δ(a) denote the value of the δ-discounted MDP with
parameter α and reward R = 1 .
vα,δ = maxa∈IN sα,δ(a) is clear21 since there exists a pure optimal stationary strat-
egy in the δ-discounted MDP. The parameter α being fixed, we are now interested
in maximizing sα,δ for δ close to 1. Differentiating the function (a 7→ (1−αa)1−α+(1−δ)α−a )
and proceeding by asymptotical equivalence when δ goes to 1, naturally leads to
the introduction of the following quantity.
Definition 4.4. When δ ∈ [α, 1), we define a∗ = a∗(α, δ) in IR+ such that:
αa
∗
=
√
1− δ
1− α.
Let ∆1(α) = {1 − (1 − α)α2a, a ∈ IN} be the set of discount factors δ such that
a∗(α, δ) is an integer, and let ∆2(α) = {1− (1−α)α2a+η, a ∈ IN, η ∈ [−3/2, 3/2]}
be the set of discount factors δ such that a∗(α, δ) ∈ N+ [1/4, 3/4].
∆1(α) and ∆2(α) contain discount factors arbitrarily close to 1. a
∗ can be ex-
pressed in closed form as a∗ = ln(1−δ)−ln(1−α)
2 lnα
. Since δln(1−δ) converges to 1 when
δ goes to 1, we obtain: δa
∗ −−→
δ→1
1.
Proposition 4.5.
1) vα,δ −−→
δ→1
1.
2) For α < 1/4 and δ ∈ ∆1(α), the a∗(α, δ)-strategy is optimal in the MDP
and
lim
δ→1,δ∈∆1(α)
1− vα,δ√
1− δ =
2√
1− α.
3) For all α,
lim inf
δ→1,δ∈∆2(α)
1− vα,δ√
1− δ ≥
1√
α1/2(1− α) .
21One can verify analytically that the maximum of sα,δ over IN is achieved, since 0 = sα,δ(0) =
lim+∞ sα,δ.
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The convergence property in 1) is very intuitive: when δ is high, the decision-
maker can wait for the state variable to be very low, so that she takes the risky
action with high probability of success. Points 2) (when α < 1/4) and 3) give
asymptotic expansions for the value vα,δ when δ goes to 1, respectively of the form
vα,δ = 1−2
√
1−δ
1−α +
√
1− δ εα(δ) and vα,δ ≤ 1−
√
1−δ
α1/2(1−α) +
√
1− δ ε′α(δ), where
εα and ε
′
α are functions with limit 0 when δ goes to 1. Later on, the parameter
α will be small, and the situation of the associated player will be much better
when δ is close to 1 in ∆1(α) compared to when δ is close to 1 in ∆2(α). The
proof of proposition 4.5 is based on simple computations that are presented in
the Appendix.
4.3 A zero-sum stochastic game with perfect information
We fix here two parameters α and β in (0, 1), and define a 2-player zero-sum
stochastic game Γα,β with infinite state space:
X = {(1, q), q ∈ [0, 1]} ∪ {(2, l), l ∈ [0, 1]} ∪ 0∗ ∪ 1∗.
Player 1 Player 2
J1, 1− q J2, 1− l
(1, 1)
(1, q)
(1, αq)
(1, 0)
0∗
(2, 1)
(2, l)
(2, βl)
(2, 0)
1∗
J1, q
W1, α
W1, 1− α
J2, l
W2, β
W2, 1− β
Figure 1: The stochastic game Γα,β
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The initial state is (2, 1). The sum of the payoffs of the players is constant22
equal to 1. States 0∗ and 1∗ are absorbing states with, respectively, payoffs 0 and
1 to player 1. The payoffs only depend on the states, and the payoff of player
1 is 0 in a state of the form (1, q) , and 1 in a state of the form (2, l). Each
player has 2 actions: Wait or Jump. Transitions in a state (1, q) are controlled by
player 1 only: if player 1 Waits in state (1, q), then the next state is (1, αq) with
probability α and (1, 1) with probability 1− α, as in the MDP of subsection 4.2,
and if player 1 Jumps in state (1, q), then the next state is 0∗ with probability
q and (2, 1) with probability 1 − q. Similarly, transitions in a state (2, l) are
controlled by player 2 only: if player 2 Waits in state (2, l), then the next state
is (2, βl) with probability β and (2, 1) with probability 1 − β, and if player 2
Jumps in state (2, l), then the next state is 1∗ with probability l and (1, 1) with
probability 1 − l. Payoffs are discounted with discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1), and the
value of the stochastic game is denoted vα,β,δ.
The strategic aspects of this game have strong similarities with those of the
previous MDP. Consider for instance Player 1, his payoff is 0 in 0∗ and all states
(1, q), and his payoff is 1 in 1∗ and the states (2, l). Starting from state (1,1), the
only possibility for Player 1 to obtain positive payoffs is to Jump at some period
to try to reach the state (2, 1). He can wait for the state to be (1, q) with q small,
so that the risk of reaching the state 0∗ while jumping is low, but each period in
a state (1, q) gives him a null payoff so he should not wait too long. The situation
is symmetric for player 2, apart from the fact that the initial state is (2, 1), hence
controlled by him.
Since the game is discounted and states are controlled by a single player, it is
natural to look at pure stationary23 strategies of the players.
Definition 4.6. For a in IN , the a-strategy of Player 1 is the strategy where
Player 1 Jumps in a state (1, q) if and only if q ≤ αa. Similarly, for b in IN the
b-strategy of Player 2 is the strategy where Player 2 Jumps in a state (2, l) if and
only if l ≤ βb. And we denote by gα,β,δ(a, b) the payoff of Player 1 in the stochastic
game where Player 1 uses the a-strategy and Player 2 uses the b-strategy.
Assume that Player 2 uses a b-strategy. Then Player 1 faces a MDP with
finite action sets, hence he/she has a pure stationary best reply, that is Player 1
has a best reply in the stochastic game in the form of a a-strategy. Similarly, if
Player 1 uses a a-strategy, Player 2 has a best reply in the stochastic game in the
form of a b-strategy. It is then natural to consider the game restricted to a- and
b-strategies.
22so strictly speaking, the game is constant-sum and not zero-sum, but we make the usual
language abuse.
23Notice that a and b-strategies are not fully defined in definition 4.6, since they do not specify
the actions played in the absorbing states nor in the states controlled by the other player. Since
these actions have no impact on the game, we will simply ignore them.
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Lemma 4.7. For a and b in IN ,
gα,β,δ(a, b) =
1− sβ,δ(b)
1− sα,δ(a)sβ,δ(b) .
Proof: Recall that sα,δ(a) = (1 − αa)IEα(δTa), where Ta is the random variable
defined in subsection 4.1 and IEα denotes the expectation for the Markov chain
with parameter α. Similarly, one has sβ,δ(b) = (1− βb)IEβ(δTb).
Starting from the initial state, with probability βb the first Jump of player 2
will end up in 1∗ and the payoff for player 1 will be 1 in each period, and with
probability 1−βb the game will first stay Tb stages in a state controlled by player
2 and then reach the state (1, 1). This gives:
gα,β,δ(a, b) = β
b + (1− βb)IEβ
(
(1− δTb) + δTbg′α,β,δ(a, b)
)
,
where g′α,β,δ(a, b) denotes the payoff of the a-strategy against the b-strategy in
the game with initial state (1, 1). So gα,β,δ(a, b) = 1 + sβ,δ(b)(−1 + g′α,β,δ(a, b)).
Similarly,
g′,α,β,δ(a, b) = α
a0 + (1− αa)IEα(δTa)gα,β,δ(a, b),
so g′α,β,δ(a, b) = sα,δ(a)gα,β,δ(a, b). Hence the result of lemma 4.7.
Let us come back to the consideration that Player 2 plays a b-strategy, and
denote by R the best payoff that Player 1 can obtain against this strategy from
the state (1, 1) (if the play never reaches this state, then player 1 has nothing to
do and gets a payoff of 1 in each period). We have seen that Player 1 has a best
reply in the form of a a-strategy, and finding the best a is equivalent to finding a
pure optimal strategy in the MDP of subsection 4.2 with reward R. But we have
seen in subsection 4.2 that this optimal value for a does not depend on R, and
simply maximizes sα,δ(a). This implies that the best reply of player 1 does not
depend on b, and the corresponding a-strategy is a dominant strategy of player
1 in the zero-sum stochastic game restricted to pure stationary strategies. The
existence of dominant strategies in a zero-sum game is rather rare, and this is
an important property of the present example. It can be verified analytically by
looking at the function gα,β,δ: for all b, it is increasing in sα,δ(a), and for all a, it
is decreasing in sβ,δ(b). This proves 1) in the proposition below.
Proposition 4.8. Let a# and b# be respectively maximizers of sα,δ(a) for a in IN ,
and of sβ,δ(b) for b in IN , i.e. be non negative integers such that sα,δ(a
#) = vα,δ
and sβ,δ(b
#) = vβ,δ.
1) The a#-strategy, resp. the b#-strategy, is a dominant strategy for player
1, resp. player 2, in the zero-sum stochastic game restricted to pure stationary
strategies.
2) The a#-strategy, resp. the b#-strategy, is an optimal strategy for player 1,
resp. player 2, in the zero-sum stochastic game Γα,β.
3) The value of Γα,β satisfies:
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vα,β,δ =
1− vβ,δ
1− vα,δvβ,δ .
Proof: 2) The strategy profile induced by (a#, b#) is a Nash equilibrium of the
game Γα,β restricted to pure stationary strategies. Since against a pure station-
ary strategy each player has a pure stationary best reply, this strategy profile is
indeed a Nash equilibrium of the game Γα,β. Hence the value of Γα,β is the payoff
induced by this strategy profile, and 3) follows.
Notice that vα,α,δ =
1
1+vα,δ
−−→
δ→1
1
2
. We are interested in cases where α 6= β,
and the next proposition is a building brick for our global construction.
Proposition 4.9. For each ε > 0, there exists n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n ≥ n0,
and α := 1/n and β := 1/(n+ 1), we have:
lim sup
δ→1
vα,β,δ ≥ 1− ε, and lim inf
δ→1
vα,β,δ ≤ ε.
Proof: We proceed in 2 steps.
Step 1: Define ∆1(α, β) := ∆1(α) ∩∆2(β), that is:
∆1(α, β) = {δ ∈ [0, 1), ∃(a, b, η) ∈ IN2×[−3/2, 3/2], δ = 1−(1−α)α2a = 1−(1−β)β2b+η}.
Discount factors in ∆1(α, β) simultaneously favor player 1 and disfavor player
2 in their respective MDP: for δ ∈ ∆1(α, β), we have by proposition 4.5 that
vα,δ = 1− 2
√
1−δ
1−α +
√
1− δ εα(δ) and vβ,δ ≤ 1−
√
1−δ
β1/2(1−β) +
√
1− δ ε′β(δ), with
limδ→1 εα = limδ→1 ε′β = 0. Since vα,β,δ =
1−vβ,δ
1−vα,δvβ,δ is decreasing in vβ,δ, we obtain:
vα,β,δ ≥
√
1−δ
β1/2(1−β) −
√
1− δ ε′β(δ)
1−
(
1− 2
√
1−δ
1−α +
√
1− δ εα(δ)
)(
1−
√
1−δ
β1/2(1−β) +
√
1− δ ε′β(δ)
) ,
≥
√
1−δ
β1/2(1−β) −
√
1− δ ε′β(δ)√
1−δ
β1/2(1−β) + 2
√
1−δ
1−α +
√
1− δ ε′′(δ)
, where lim
δ→1
ε′′ = 0.
This implies, if ∆1(α, β) contains discount factors arbitrarily close to 1:
lim inf
δ→1,δ∈∆1(α,β)
vα,β,δ ≥ 1
1 + 2
√
β1/2(1−β)
1−α
. (1)
In the same vein, we define ∆2(α, β) := ∆2(α) ∩∆1(β), that is:
∆2(α, β) = {δ ∈ [0, 1), ∃(a, b, η) ∈ IN2×[−3/2, 3/2], δ = 1−(1−α)α2a+η = 1−(1−β)β2b}.
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Discount factors in ∆2(α, β) simultaneously disfavor player 1 and favor player 2
in their respective MDP, and similar computations as above show that if ∆2(α, β)
contains discount factors arbitrarily close to 1,
lim sup
δ→1,δ∈∆2(α,β)
vα,β,δ ≤ 1
1 + 1
2
√
(1−β)
α1/2(1−α)
. (2)
Our goal, inspired by (1) and (2), is now to prove that there exists α and β
arbitrarily small such that both ∆1(α, β) and ∆2(α, β) contain discount factors
arbitrarily close to 1.
Step 2:
We want to prove that for n big enough, there exists an infinite number of
pairs (a, b, η) ∈ N2 × [−3/2, 3/2] verifying
1− (1− α)α2a = 1− (1− β)β2b+η,
that is,
ln(β)−1 [ln((1− α)/(1− β)) + 2a ln(α)] = 2b+ η.
Let A(α, β) := ln(β)−1 ln((1−α)/(1− β)) and B(α, β) := ln(β)−1 ln(α)− 1. The
last equation can be written as
A(α, β) + 2B(α, β)a = 2(b− a) + η.
If B(α, β) < 1/4, then this equation has an infinite number of solutions (a, b, η) ∈
N
2 × [−3/2, 3/2]. Set αn := 1/n and βn := 1/(n + 1). For n big enough, we
have B(αn, βn) < 1/4. This implies that ∆1(αn, βn) contains discount factors
arbitrarily close to 1, and the proof is similar for ∆2(αn, βn).
Let ǫ and n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0, both ∆1(αn, βn) and ∆2(αn, βn) contain
discount factors arbitrarily close to 1, and
(
1 + 2
√
β
1/2
n (1−βn)
1−αn
)−1
≥ 1 − ǫ, and(
1 + 1
2
√
(1−βn)
α
1/2
n (1−αn)
)−1
≤ ǫ. For n ≥ n0, equations (1) and (2) yield
lim sup
δ→1
vα,β,δ ≥ 1− ǫ, and lim inf
δ→1
vα,β,δ ≤ ǫ,
and the proof of proposition 4.9 is complete.
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4.4 A zero-sum hidden stochastic game
The MDP and games considered so far have perfect information and infinite state
space. We now mimic the previous construction with a hidden stochastic game
with 6 states and 6 public signals.
α and β being parameters in (0, 1), the HSG Γ∗(α, β) is defined as follows.
The set of states is K = {(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1), (2, 0), 1∗, 0∗}, and the set of public
signals is S = {s1, s′1, s∗1, s2, s′2, s∗0}. The players perfectly observe past actions and
public signals, but not current states. As in the previous stochastic game, the
sum of the payoffs of the players is constantly 1, and the states 0∗ and 1∗ are
absorbing. The payoffs only depend on the states, player 1 has payoff 0 in states
0∗, (1, 0) and (1, 1), and payoff 1 in states 1∗, (2, 0) and (2, 1). Each player has
2 actions corresponding to Wait and Jump, action sets are I = {W1, J1} and
J = {W2, J2}. The initial probability π selects with probability 1 the state (2, 1)
and the signal s2, so the players know that at period 1 the game is in state (2, 1).
Once in the absorbing state 0∗, resp. 1∗, the play stays there forever and the
public signal is s∗0, resp. s
∗
1. Transitions from states (1, 0) and (1, 1) only depend
on the action of player 1, whereas transitions from (2, 0) and (2, 1) only depend
on the action of player 2, and when we write transitions we will omit the action
of the player without influence. More precisely:
If player 1 Jumps in state (1, 1), the play goes to the absorbing state
0∗ and the public signal is s∗0, i.e. q((1, 1), J1) selects (0
∗, s∗0) a.s.
If player 1 Jumps in state (1, 0), the play goes to state (2, 1) and the
public signal is s2, i.e. q((1, 0), J1) selects ((2, 1), s2) a.s.
Transition when player 1 Waits in state (1, 1): q((1, 1),W1) selects
((1, 1), s1) with probability 1 − α, ((1, 1), s′1) with probability α2 and
((1, 0), s′1) with probability α(1− α).
Transition when player 1 Waits in state (1, 0): q((1, 0),W1) selects
((1, 1), s1) with probability 1− α, and ((1, 0), s′1) with probability α.
Transitions from the states controlled by player 2 are defined symmetrically:
q((2, 1), J2) selects (1
∗, s∗1) a.s., q((2, 0), J2) selects ((1, 1), s1) a.s., q((2, 1),W2)
selects ((2, 1), s2) with probability 1 − β, ((2, 1), s′2) with probability β2 and
((2, 0), s′2) with probability β(1 − β), and finally q((2, 0),W2) selects ((2, 1), s2)
with probability 1− β and ((2, 0), s′2) with probability β.
Payoffs are discounted with discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
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Player 1 Player 2
(1, 1)
(1, 0)
0∗
(2, 1)
(2, 0)
1∗
W1, 1− α, s1
W1, α(1− α), s′1
W1, α
2, s′1
W1, α, s
′
1
W1, 1− α, s1
J1, s2
J1, s
∗
0
W2, 1− β, s2
W2, β(1− β), s′2
W2, β
2, s′2
W2, β, s
′
2
W2, 1− β, s2
J2, s1
J2, s
∗
1
Figure 2: Transitions in Γ∗α,β
Signals in states (1, 0) and (1, 1) are either s1 or s
′
1, and signals in states (2, 0)
and (2, 1) are either s2 or s
′
2. So the public signal always informs the players the
element of the partition {{(1, 0), (1, 1)}, {2, 0), (2, 1)}, {0∗}, {1∗}} that contains
the current state, and the game has known payoffs.
In Γ∗(α, β), player 1 would like to Jump in state (1, 0), and to Wait in state
(1, 1) but the current state is not fully known to the players. Because of the
previous partition, the belief of the players over the current state has at most 2
points in its support. Suppose this belief corresponds to the state being (1, 1)
with probability q and (1, 0) with probability 1− q. The current payoff will be 0,
and the transition only depends on player 1’s action:
If player 1 Jumps, the new state is 0∗ with probability q and (2, 1)
with probability 1− q.
If player 1 Waits: with probability 1 − α the public signal will be s1
and by Bayes’ rule the players can deduce that the new state is almost
surely (1, 1). With probability α the public signal is s′1, the probability
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that the transition selects ((1, 1), s′1) is qα
2 so by Bayes’ rule the belief
of the players over the new state is : (1, 1) with probability qα and
(1, 0) with probability 1− qα.
Consequently the transitions and the payoffs here perfectly mimic those of the
stochastic game of subsection 4.3. The equivalent stochastic game associated to
the HSG Γ∗(α, β) (see the beginning of section 3) corresponds to the game Γ(α, β),
up to the addition of the observation of the public signal at the beginning of each
period. This addition plays no role on the payoffs and could only be used as a
correlation device for the players, but in a zero-sum context this has no influence
on the value. We obtain:
Proposition 4.10. The value of the δ-discounted hidden stochastic game Γ∗(α, β)
is the value vα,β,δ of the δ-discounted stochastic game Γ(α, β).
4.5 A final example
Fix ε ∈ (0, 5
12
] and r in (0, ε/5), we finally construct a non zero-sum HSG Γ
satisfying the conditions of theorem 3.4. By proposition 4.9, it is possible to fix
α and β such that:
lim inf
δ→1
vα,β,δ < ε− 5r and lim sup
δ→1
vα,β,δ > ε+ 5r
And we define: ∆1 = {δ ∈ [1 − 2r, 1), vα,β,δ < ε − 5r} and ∆2 = {δ ∈
[ 1
1+2r
, 1), vα,β,δ > ε+ 5r}.
Because we want all payoffs of Γ to be in [0, 1], we first modify the zero-sum
HSG Γ∗(α, β) of subsection 4.4 by transforming all payoffs (1, 0) into (1−r, r) and
all payoffs (0, 1) into (r, 1 − r). That is, we apply the affine increasing transfor-
mation (x 7→ r + (1− 2r)x) to the payoffs, and the game remains constant-sum.
We obtain a new HSG Γ1 with each payoff in [r, 1 − r], and the δ-discounted
value of this new game is simply vδ = r + (1− 2r)vα,β,δ. We also define the HSG
Γ2 as the game Γ1 where the identity of the players are exchanged: player 1 in
Γ2 plays the role of player 2 in Γ1, and vice-versa. Plainly, the value of Γ2 is 1−vδ.
We now define our final HSG Γ. The states are the 6 states (1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1),
(2, 0), 1∗, 0∗ of Γ1, 4 more states24 corresponding to the states (1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1),
(2, 0) of Γ2, plus 3 extra states k1, (ε, ε)
∗ and (1 − ε, 1 − ε)∗: k1 is the initial
state and is known to the players, and (ε, ε)∗ and (1 − ε, 1 − ε)∗ are absorbing
states where the payoffs will partly depend on the actions played. Actions sets
are I = {W1, J1}× {T,B} and J = {W2, J2}× {L,R}. Γ is defined as the “inde-
pendent sum” of two different games played in parallel, the first game evolving
according to the first coordinate of the actions, and the second game evolving
according to the second coordinate of the actions.
24There is no need to duplicate states 0∗ and 1∗.
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1) At the first period, the actions of the players determine, through their first
coordinate25 a continuation game to be played:
W2 J2
W1 (ε, ε)
∗ Γ2
J1 Γ1 (1− ε, 1− ε)∗
If (W1,W2), resp. (J1, J2) is played in period 1, the game reaches the absorb-
ing state (ε, ε)∗, resp. (1 − ε, 1 − ε)∗. If (W1, J2), resp. (J1,W2), is played in
period 1, then from period 2 on the hidden stochastic game Γ2, resp. Γ1, is
played. The payoffs of the first game in period 1 are respectively defined as (ε, ε),
(1−ε, 1−ε), (0, 0) and (0, 0) if (W1,W2), (J1, J2), (W1, J2) and (J1,W2) is played.
2) In addition, at every period of Γ the players play, through the second
coordinate of their actions, the following bimatrix game G, independently of
everything else.
L R
T r, r −r, r
B r,−r −r,−r
In each period, the payoffs in Γ are the sum of the payoffs of the two games.
For instance if the state is (ε, ε)∗ and the second components of the actions are
(B,L), then the stage payoffs are ε + r for player 1 and ε− r for player 2. If at
the first period (J1,W2) is played then at any subsequent stage the payoffs of the
players are the payoffs in Γ1 plus the payoffs in G. One can easily check that all
payoffs lie in [0, 1].
Past actions are perfectly observed. The public signals are those of Γ1 or Γ2
when these games are played, and we add one specific public signal for the initial
state and each absorbing state (ε, ε)∗ and (1− ε, 1− ε)∗, so that Γ has 13 public
signals and is a hidden stochastic game with known payoffs. Moreover the game
is symmetric between the players.
First notice that in G, each player chooses the payoff of the other player,
hence any profile is a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium payoff set of G is the
square of feasible payoffs [−r, r]2. For each initial probability and discount factor,
the modification of Γ where the game G is removed has a sequential equilibrium
yielding some payoff (x, y). Combining independently such equilibrium with any
sequential equilibrium of the repetition of G gives a sequential equilibrium of Γ.
Then the square centered in (x, y) with side 2r is included in the set of sequential
equilibrium of Γ for this initial probability and discount factor. This proves the
third item of theorem 3.4.
25At period 1, W1,W2, J1, J2 should not be interpreted as Wait or Jump.
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From now on, we consider the game Γ with initial state k1. The idea is quite
simple: for δ in ∆1, vδ will be significantly smaller than ε and all equilibria of Γ
will play (W1,W2) in the first period; whereas for δ in ∆2, vδ will be much greater
than ε and all equilibria of Γ will play (J1, J2) in period 1.
Proposition 4.11.
1) For δ in ∆1, Eδ = E
′
δ is the square [ε − r, ε + r]2, and this is also the
set of communication equilibria of the δ-discounted game, as well as the set of
stationary equilibrium payoffs of the associated stochastic game.
2) For δ in ∆2, Eδ = E
′
δ is the square [1 − ε − r, 1− ε+ r]2, and this is also
the set of communication equilibria of the δ-discounted game, as well as the set
of stationary equilibrium payoffs of the associated stochastic game.
Proof: First consider, for any discount δ, the subgame induced by Γ after (J1,W2)
has been played in period 1, discounted from period 2 on. By playing opti-
mally in the Γ1 component, player 1 can secure a payoff of vδ − r, whereas
player 2 can secure a payoff of 1 − vδ − r. Since the sum of the payoffs is
not greater than 1 + 2r, all equilibrium payoffs of this subgame lie in the set
[vδ − r, vδ + 3r]× [1 − vδ − r, 1− vδ + 3r]. Symmetrically, equilibrium payoffs of
the subgame induced by Γ after (J1,W2) has been played in period 1, belong to
the square [1− vδ − r, 1− vδ + 3r]× [vδ − r, vδ + 3r].
1) Fix a discount factor δ in ∆1. We have vδ = r+(1−2r)vα,β,δ, so δvδ < ε−4r.
Consider a Nash equilibrium (σ, τ) of the δ-discounted game Γ, and denote by x,
resp. y, the probability that σ plays W1, resp. τ plays W2 at stage 1. We will
show that x = y = 1, and first assume for the sake of contradiction that x < 1.
By playing W1 at period 1 and optimally in Γ2 afterwards, player 1 can get a
payoff not lower than:
A := y(ε− r) + (1− y)(δ(1− vδ)− r).
This should not exceed the payoff obtained against τ by playing J1 at period 1
and following σ afterwards, and this payoff is not greater than
B := y(δ(vδ + 3r) + (1− δ)r) + (1− y)(1− ε+ r),
because if y > 0 the continuation strategies after (J1,W2) should form a Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding subgame. Because δvδ < ε−2r(1+δ), we obtain
that ε− r > δ(vδ + 3r) + (1− δ)r. Because δvδ < ε− 4r and δ ≥ 1− 2r, we have
δvδ < ε − 2r + δ − 1, and this implies δ(1 − vδ) − r > 1 − ε + r. Consequently,
for all values of y in [0, 1] we have A > B, which is a contradiction. Hence we
obtain x = 1, and by symmetry y = 1. All Nash equilibrium of Γ play W1 and
W2 in period 1, and the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs Eδ is included in the
square [ε − r, ε + r]2. The players can combine (W1,W2) in period 1 with the
repetition of any given mixed Nash equilibrium of G, so any point in the square
can be achieved at equilibrium, and Eδ = [ε − r, ε + r]2. Considering sequential
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equilibria, or introducing a correlation device, even with communication, would
not modify the above proof. And this is the same with stationary equilibria of
the associated stochastic game with state variable the belief on K. This proves
1) of the proposition.
2) We proceed similarly for δ in ∆2. We have vδ > r+(1−2r)(ε+5r) > ε+4r,
which implies both: δvδ >
ε+4r
1+2r
> ε+2r, and δvδ > δ(ε+4r) ≥ ε+2r+δ(1+2r)−1.
Let (σ, τ) be a Nash equilibrium of the δ-discounted game Γ, and with x, resp. y,
being the probability that σ plays W1, resp. τ plays W2, at period 1. Assume for
the sake of contradiction that x > 0. By playing W1 at period 1 and following σ
afterwards, the payoff of player 1 against τ is at most:
A′ := y(ε+ r) + (1− y)((1− δ)r + δ(1− vδ + 3r)).
This should not be lower than the payoff obtained by playing J1 at period 1 and
optimally in Γ1 afterwards, so not lower than:
B′ := y((1− δ)(−r) + δ(vδ − r)) + (1− y)(1− ε− r).
Since δvδ > ε + 2r and δvδ > ε + 2r + δ(1 + 2r) − 1, we get B′ > A′, hence a
contradiction. We deduce x = 0, and by symmetry y = 0. And point 2) of the
proposition follows.
Since ε + r < 1 − ε − r, proposition 4.11 clearly implies that no converging
selection of (Eδ)δ exists.
We now consider perturbations of the payoffs. Let, for η ∈ [0, r(ε−5r)
4
), Γ(η) be
a HSG obtained from Γ by perturbing each payoff by at most η, and denote by
Eδ(η), resp. E
′
δ(η), the corresponding set of δ-discounted Nash, resp. sequential
equilibrium payoffs with initial state k1.
Proposition 4.12.
1) For all δ in ∆1, Eδ(η) ⊂ [ε− r − 2η, ε+ r + 2η]2.
Moreover , lim
η→0
lim
δ→1,δ∈∆1
E ′δ(η) = E1, and lim
δ→1,δ∈∆1
lim sup
η→0
d(Eδ(η), E1) = 0.
2) For all δ in ∆2, Eδ(η) ⊂ [1− ε− r − 2η, 1− ε+ r + 2η]2.
Moreover , lim
η→0
lim
δ→2,δ∈∆1
E ′δ(η) = E2, and lim
δ→1,δ∈∆2
lim sup
η→0
d(Eδ(η), E2) = 0.
3) There is no converging selection (xδ)δ of (Eδ(η))δ.
4) The game Γ(η) has no uniform equilibrium payoff.
The proof is in the Appendix, and concludes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
30
5 Appendix
Definition 5.1. Let A be a subset of the Euclidean space IRN . A is semi-algebraic
if it is defined by a finite number of polynomial inequalities, i.e. if A is a finite
union of sets, each of these sets being defined as the conjunction of finitely many
weak or strict polynomial inequalities.
We believe that the following proposition, which is a direct consequence of
the Main Theorem in [15], can be useful in several contexts.
Proposition 5.2. Let (Wδ)δ∈[0,1) be a family of non-empty compact subsets of the
Euclidean space IRN . Assume that {(δ, x)|, δ ∈ [0, 1), x ∈ Wδ} is a semi-algebraic
subset of IRN+1. Then when δ goes to one, Wδ converges for the Hausdorff dis-
tance to a non-empty compact subset W of IRN .
Proof of Proposition 2.1 LetW be the set of (δ, x, y, r) ∈ [0, 1)×(IRI × IRJ × IR2)K
such that (x, y) is a stationary equilibrium in Γδ, and r is the associated payoff
equilibrium. Then (δ, x, y, r) ∈ W if and only if for all (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J , it
satisfies the following inequalities and equalities :∑
i′∈I
xi
′
(k) = 1, xi(k) ≥ 0,
∑
j′∈J
xj
′
(k) = 1, yj(k) ≥ 0,
∑
i′∈I
xi
′
(k)
(
(1− δ)u2(k, i′, j) + δ
∑
k′∈K
qk
′
(k, i′, j)r2(k
′)
)
≤ r2(k),
∑
j′∈J
yj
′
(k)
(
(1− δ)u1(k, i, j′) + δ
∑
k′∈K
qk
′
(k, i, j′)r1(k
′)
)
≤ r1(k),
∑
i′∈I
∑
j′∈J
xi
′
(k)yj
′
(k)
(
(1− δ)u2(k, i′, j′) + δ
∑
k′∈K
qk
′
(k, i′, j′)r2(k
′)
)
= r2(k),
∑
i′∈I
∑
j′∈J
xi
′
(k)yj
′
(k)
(
(1− δ)u1(k, i′, j′) + δ
∑
k′∈K
qk
′
(k, i′, j′)r1(k
′)
)
= r1(k).
Thus W is a semi-algebraic set.
For δ ∈ [0, 1), let Wδ :=
{
(x, y, r) ∈ (IRI × IRJ × IR2)K | (δ, x, y, r) ∈ W}.
Then Wδ is non-empty and compact. Applying the preceding proposition, we
deduce that (Wδ) converges for the Hausdorff metric when δ goes to 1. In par-
ticular, (E ′′δ ) converges for the Hausdorff metric.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
1) Define aˆ = aˆ(α, δ) as the integer part of a∗ = a∗(α, δ), we have vα,δ ≥
sα,δ(aˆ(α, δ)). Since aˆ > a
∗ − 1, we have αaˆ ≤
√
1−δ
1−α
1
α
−−→
δ→1
0. Since aˆ ≤ a∗, we
have (1 − δ)(αδ)−aˆ ≤
√
1−δ
1−α δ
−a∗ −−→
δ→1
0. Consequently, limδ→1 sα,δ(aˆ(α, δ)) = 1,
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which implies that limδ→1 vα,δ = 1.
We now turn to the proof of conditions 2) and 3) of proposition 4.5, and start
with a lemma.
Lemma 5.3. For all α and δ in (0, 1),
1− 2 δ−a∗−1
√
1− δ
1− α ≤ sα,δ(a
∗) ≤ 1− 2
√
1− δ
1− α + 3
1− δ
1− α, (3)
sα,δ(a) ≤ 1− 1√
α1/2
√
1− δ
1− α +
1− δ
1− α(α +
1
α1/2
). (4)
Proof of lemma 5.3: We use 1 − αδ ≥ 1 − α in the fist line below and
δ−a
∗−1 ≥ 1 in the third line below to obtain the LHS of (3):
sα,δ(a
∗) ≥ 1− α
a∗
1 + 1−δ
1−αα
−a∗δ−a∗−1
,
=
1−
√
1−δ
1−α
1 +
√
1−δ
1−α δ
−a∗−1
,
≥
1−
√
1−δ
1−α δ
−a∗−1
1 +
√
1−δ
1−α δ
−a∗−1
,
≥ 1− 2
√
1− δ
1− αδ
−a∗−1.
For inequality (4), we introduce lα,δ(a) =
1−αa
1+ 1−δ
1−α
α−aδ−a−1
. If a ≤ a∗ − 1/4,
we have αa ≥ αa∗−1/4 =
√
1−δ
α1/2(1−α) , and lα,δ(a) ≤ 1 − αa ≤ 1 −
√
1−δ
α1/2(1−α) . If
a ≥ a∗ + 1/4, we have α−a ≥ α−a∗−1/4 and we write:
lα,δ(a) ≤ 1
1 + 1−δ
1−αα
−a
≤ 1
1 +
√
1−δ
α1/2(1−α)
≤ 1−
√
1− δ
α1/2(1− α) +
1− δ
α1/2(1− α) .
And inequality (4) is obtained after noticing that:
sα,δ(a) = lα,δ(a) + (1− δ) α
1− αlα,δ(a)
≤ lα,δ(a) + (1− δ) α
1− α.
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We conclude with the RHS of (3). We use δ−a
∗−1 ≥ 1 in the first inequality below,
and 1−x
1+x
≤ 1− 2x+ 2x2 for all x ≥ 0 in the third inequality below:
lα,δ(a
∗) ≤ 1− α
a∗
1 + 1−δ
1−αα
−a∗ ,
=
1−
√
1−δ
1−α
1 +
√
1−δ
1−α
,
≤ 1− 2
√
1− δ
1− α + 2
1− δ
1− α.
sα,δ(a
∗) ≤ lα,δ(a∗) + 1−δ1−α finally gives the RHS of (3). This concludes the proof of
lemma 5.3.
We now prove point (2) of proposition 4.5. Fix α < 1/4, we have 1√
α
> 2 so
for δ close enough to 1,
2δ−a
∗−1 +
√
1− δ
1− α(α + 1/α) <
1√
α
,
which implies that:
1− 2 δ−a∗−1
√
1− δ
1− α > 1−
1√
α
√
1− δ
1− α +
1− δ
1− α(α + 1/α).
For δ ∈ ∆1(α), the a∗-strategy is available in the MDP, and the previous inequal-
ity shows that it is an optimal strategy. vα,δ = sα,δ(a
∗), and (3) of lemma 5.3
implies limδ→1,δ∈∆1(α)
1−vα,δ
2
√
1−δ
1−α
= 1.
We finally prove point (3) of proposition 4.5, and consider δ ∈ ∆2(α). The
pure stationary strategies available in the MDP are a-strategies, with |a− a∗| ≥
1/4. Point (4) of lemma 5.3 then implies that: vα,δ ≤ 1 − 1√α
√
1−δ
1−α +
1−δ
1−α(α +
1/α1/2), hence the result.
Proof of Proposition 4.12
For any discount factor, the perturbed game issued from Γ1 may no longer be
zero-sum, but the quantity that player 1 can guarantee (whatever the strategy
of the other player) in this game is close to vδ. More precisely, in the subgame
induced by Γ(η) after (J1,W2) has been played in period 1, player 1 can secure a
payoff of vδ−r−η, whereas player 2 can secure a payoff of 1−vδ−r−η. Since the
sum of the payoffs is now not greater than 1+2r+2η, all equilibrium payoffs of this
subgame lie in the set [vδ−r−η, vδ+3r+3η]×[1−vδ−r−η, 1−vδ+3r+3η]. Sym-
metrically, all equilibrium payoffs of the subgame induced by Γ(η) after (W1, J2)
has been played in period 1, are in the set [1− vδ− r− η, 1− vδ+3r+3η]× [vδ−
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r − η, vδ + 3r + 3η].
1) Fix δ in ∆1, we have vδ < r + (1− 2r)(ε− 5r) and δ ≥ 1− 2r. This implies:
vδ ≤ min{ε− 4(r + η), ε− 2(r + η) + δ − 1}. (5)
Mimicking the proof of 1) of proposition 4.11, we obtain A(η) = y(ε−r−η)+(1−
y)(δ(1−vδ)−r−η) andB(η) = y(δ(vδ+3r+3η)+(1−δ)(r+η))+(1−y)(1−ε+r+η),
so that A(η) and B(η) are obtained from the quantities A and B of that lemma by
replacing the payoff r by the payoff r+η. By inequality (5), we have A(η) > B(η).
This implies that any δ-discounted Nash equilibrium of Γ(η) plays W1 and W2 at
the first period, and Eδ(η) ⊂ [ε− r − η, ε+ r + η]2.
Fix now η in (0, r(ε−5r)
2
). Define Γ(η)(W1,W2) as the subgame obtained from
Γ(η) after (W1,W2) has been played in period 1. Γ(η)(W1,W2) is a repeated
game, with stage payoffs η-close to the bimatrix:
(W2, L) (J2, L) (W2, R) (J2, R)
(W1, T ) r + ε, r + ε r + ε, r + ε −r + ε, r + ε −r + ε, r + ε
(J1, T ) r + ε, r + ε r + ε, r + ε −r + ε, r + ε −r + ε, r + ε
(W1, B) r + ε,−r + ε r + ε,−r + ε −r + ε,−r + ε −r + ε,−r + ε
(J1, B) r + ε,−r + ε r + ε,−r + ε −r + ε,−r + ε −r + ε,−r + ε
By the Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), the set E ′δ(η)(W1,W2)
of sequential equilibrium payoffs of Γ(η)(W1,W2) converges, when δ goes to 1,
to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of this game. And this
set now converges, when η goes to 0, to the square E1 = [−r + ε, r + ε]2.
Since all sequential equilibria of Γ(η) play (W1,W2) in period 1, we obtain
limη→0 limδ→1,δ∈∆1 E
′
δ(η) = E1.
Consider now the repetition of the bimatrix game G. Fix ε′ > 0, there exists
δ′ such that for all δ ≥ δ′ and any payoff u in [−r, r]2, there exists a periodic
sequence (it, jt)t of pure action profiles in {T,B} × {L,R} such that for all t0,
playing the sequence (it, jt)t≥t0 yields a δ-discounted payoff ε
′-close to u. Assume
u = (u1, u2) ∈ [−r+2ε′, r]2 and η < min{ε′, r(ε−5r)2 }, we have ul− ε′ > −r+ η for
each player l = 1, 2. For δ ∈ ∆1, δ ≥ δ′, the strategy profile where: (W1,W2) is
played at stage 1, and for the second component of the actions, the above sequence
of pure actions is played, with deviations punished by repeating forever (J1, J2),
is a Nash equilibrium of the δ-discounted game Γ(η). Hence Eδ(η) contains a
point ε′-close to u, and d(Eδ(η), E1) ≤ 2ε′. So lim supη→0 d(Eδ(η), E1) ≤ 2ε′,
and limδ→1,δ∈∆1 lim supη→0 d(Eδ(η), E1) = 0.
2) For δ in ∆2, we have δvδ > δ(r + (1 − 2r)(ε + 5r)). Since η < 12(1 − ε − 5r),
we have r + (1 − 2r)(ε + 5r) > ε + 4(r + η), and since ε − 1 + 2(r + η) < 0, it
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implies r + (1− 2r)(ε+ 5r) > 1
δ
(ε− 1 + 2(r + η)) + 1 + 2(r + η). So:
δvδ > ε− 1 + 2(r + η) + δ(1 + 2(r + η)). (6)
Since δ ≥ 1
1+2r
, the above also implies:
δvδ > ε+ 2(r + η). (7)
We mimick the proof of 2) of proposition 4.11 and obtain quantities A′(η) =
y(ε + r + η) + (1 − y)((1 − δ)(r + η) + δ(1 − vδ + 3r + 3η)), and B′(η) =
y((1− δ)(−r − η) + δ(vδ − r − η)) + (1− y)(1− ε− r − η). And the inequalities
(6) and (7) imply that B′(η) > A′(η), hence any δ-discounted Nash equilibrium
of Γ(η) plays J1 and J2 at the first period. The rest of the proof of 2) is similar
to the proof of 1).
3) We have ε + r + η < ε + r(1 + 1
2
ε− 5r) < 1/2 since r < ε/5 and ε < 5/12.
Hence there is no converging selection (xδ)δ of (Eδ(η))δ.
4) It remains to prove that Γ(η) has no equilibrium payoff, i.e. that for ε′ small
enough, there is no strategy profile which is an ε′-equilibrium of all discounted
games Γ(η) with high enough discount factors.
We proceed by contradiction, and assume that for each ε′ > 0, on can find
a discount δε′ in (0,1), and a strategy profile (σ, τ) = (σε′, τε′) which is an ε
′-
equilibrium of each game Γ(η) with discount δ > δε′. Denote by x = xε′, resp.
y = yε′, the probability that σ plays W1, resp. τ plays W2 at stage 1. The
δ-discounted payoff of player 1 induced by (σε, τε) is by definition:
gδ1(σ, τ) = IEσ,τ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(kt, it, jt)
)
.
We denote by gδ1(σ, τ |W1,W2) the conditional payoff of player 1 given that (W1,W2)
is played at period 1, that is:
Eσ,τ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(kt, it, jt)
∣∣∣∣∣ (i1 = (W1, T ) or (W1, B)) and (j1 = (W2, L) or (W2, R))
)
.
And we similarly define gδ1(σ, τ |W1, J2), gδ1(σ, τ |J1,W2), gδ1(σ, τ |J1, J2) and similar
quantities for player 2’s payoff. We have:
gδ1(σ, τ) = xyg
δ
1(σ, τ |W1,W2) + x(1 − y)gδ1(σ, τ |W1, J2)
+(1− x)ygδ1(σ, τ |J1,W2) + (1− x)(1− y)gδ1(σ, τ |J1, J2).
Because player 1 can secure the payoff vδ in the game Γ1, the fact that (σ, τ) is
an ε′-equilibrium implies that:
gδ1(σ, τ |J1,W2) ≥ δvδ − (r + η)−
ε′
(1− x)y .
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Similarly, gδ1(σ, τ |W1, J2) ≥ δ(1−vδ)−(r+η)− ε
′
x(1−y) , g
δ
2(σ, τ |W1, J2) ≥ δvδ−(r+
η)− ε′
x(1−y) , and g
δ
2(σ, τ |J1,W2) ≥ δ(1−vδ)−(r+η)− ε
′
(1−x)y . Since g
δ
1(σ, τ |W1, J2)+
gδ2(σ, τ |W1, J2) ≤ 1 + 2r + 2η, we obtain:
gδ1(σ, τ |W1, J2) ≤ 1 + 3(r + η)− δvδ +
ε′
x(1− y) (8)
gδ1(σ, τ |J1,W2) ≤ 1 + 3(r + η)− δ(1− vδ) +
ε′
y(1− x) (9)
a) By definition (σ, τ) is an ε′-equilibrium, so playing J1 at period 1 then
optimally afterwards against τ should not increase player1’s payoff by more than
ε′, i.e;
y sup
σ′
gδ1(σ
′, τ |J1,W2) + (1− y) sup
σ′
gδ1(σ
′, τ |J1, J2) ≤ ε′ + gδ1(σ, τ).
This implies:
xy sup
σ′
gδ1(σ
′, τ |J1,W2)+x(1−y) sup
σ′
gδ1(σ
′, τ |J1, J2) ≤ ε′+xygδ1(σ, τ |W1,W2)+x(1−y)gδ1(σ, τ |W1, J2).
We have gδ1(σ, τ |W1,W2) ≤ ε + r + η, supσ′ gδ1(σ′, τ |J1,W2) ≥ δvδ − r − η and
supσ′ g
δ
1(σ
′, τ |J1, J2) ≥ 1− ε− r − η. Together with inequality (8), it implies:
xy(δvδ−r−2η)+x(1−y)(1−ε−r−η) ≤ 2ε′+xy(ε+r+η)+x(1−y)(1+3(r+η)−δvδ).
Rearranging terms, the above equation is equivalent to:
2ε′ + 2x(r + η)(2− y) ≥ x(δvδ − ε).
x = xε′ and y = yε′ depend on ε
′. Consider δ in ∆2, we have vδ > ε+4(r+η).
So there exists ε′′ > 0, independent from ε′, such that for all δ high enough in
∆2:
2ε′ + 2xε′(r + η)(2− yε′) ≥ 4xε′(r + η) + xε′ε′′.
Passing to the limit gives:
xε′ −−−→
ε′→0
0.
And by symmetry between the players, we also have limε′→0 yε′ = 0.
b) We finally write that playing W1 at period 1 then optimally afterwards
against τ should not increase player 1’s payoff by more than ε′, i.e;
y sup
σ′
gδ1(σ
′, τ |W1,W2) + (1− y) sup
σ′
gδ1(σ
′, τ |W1, J2) ≤ ε′ + gδ1(σ, τ).
This implies: y(1−x) supσ′ gδ1(σ′, τ |W1,W2)+ (1− y)(1−x) supσ′ gδ1(σ′, τ |W1, J2)
≤ ε′ + (1− x)ygδ1(σ, τ |J1,W2) + (1− x)(1− y)gδ1(σ, τ |J1, J2).
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We have gδ1(σ, τ |J1, J2) ≤ 1− ε+ r+ η, supσ′ gδ1(σ′, τ |W1,W2) ≥ ε− r− η and
supσ′ g
δ
1(σ
′, τ |W1, J2) ≥ δ(1− vδ)− r− η. Together with inequality (9), the above
implies :
2ε′ + 2(r + η)(1− x)(1 + y) ≥ (1− x)(ε− 1 + δ(1− vδ)).
For δ ∈ ∆1, we have vδ < ε − 4(r + η) so for all δ high enough in ∆1:
ε− 1 + δ(1− vδ) ≥ 4(r + η) and we obtain:
ε′
r + η
+ (1− x)(1 + y) ≥ 2(1− x).
We finally get a contradiction since limε′→0 x = limε′→0 y = 0.
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